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Abstract 
Using migration data in 1990 and 2000, we find that inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in non-OECD 
countries affects the out-migration of individuals with tertiary and secondary education to OECD countries 
originating the investments, but has no significant effect on the out-migration of individuals with primary 
education. Distinguishing between linkage and home effects, our results show a dominant home effect of FDI for 
individuals with tertiary education, but a stronger linkage effect for those with secondary education. The existing 
stock of former migrants in foreign countries influences the out-migration of individuals with primary education. 
Said Anney Unnikrishnan, a personnel manager at 24/7, ‘I finished my MBA and I remember writing the 
GMAT and getting into Purdue University. But I couldn’t go because I couldn’t afford it. I didn’t have the 
money for it. Now I can, [but] I see a whole lot of American industry has come into Bangalore and I don’t 
really need to go there. I can work for a multinational sitting right here. So I still get my rice and sambar 
[a traditional Indian dish], which I eat ... I still continue with my Indian food and I still work for a 
multinational. Why should I go to America?’ (Friedman, 2005, p. 28) 
1. Introduction 
The past several decades have seen a dramatic increase in international labour mobility. From 1960 to 2005, the 
international migrants stock has gone up from 75 million to 191 million, representing an unprecedented 155 
per cent increase (United Nations, 2006). The magnitude of growth in the international labour movement has 
attracted much attention from both policymakers and academic researchers, with much of the research 
concentrating on the relationship between international trade and migration. Such a focus is understandable 
given the importance of trade and the fact that standard trade theory considers trade in final goods as a 
substitute for factors moving across international borders. However, compared to trade, capital flows by many 
measures have grown even faster. For instance, world foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows rose from $55 
billion in 1980 to $1,243.7 billion in 2010, increasing by a remarkable 2,161 per cent (United Nations 2011).1 
In this paper, we explore the relationship between inward FDI in less developed countries (LDCs) and the 
migration of individuals with different levels of education from LDCs to developed OECD countries (DCs) 
originating the investments. Our study adds to the small literature on FDI and migration and contributes to the 
literature by systematically examining the effect of inward FDI on the out-migration of individuals with three 
levels of education, namely primary, secondary and tertiary education. 
The number of studies on FDI migration is gradually growing in the past decade. However, as pointed out 
by Javorcik et al. (2011, p. 231), ‘the link between FDI and migration remains relatively unexplored’. The existing 
empirical research on this topic, in general, can be categorised into two branches, investigating the FDI–
migration dependence from two distinct directions. 
The first branch devotes attention to the effect of inward FDI in a host country on the out-migration from this 
host (see Hayase, 2001; Aroca and Maloney, 2005; Sanderson and Kentor, 2008). Hayase (2001, p. 555), 
employing data on FDI from Japan to East Asian economies, states that ‘such investment could influence 
international migration positively or negatively … further empirical studies are needed to clarify these 
relationships’. Aroca and Maloney (2005) study the internal migration patterns in Mexico. Taking the US as the 
33rd state of Mexico, the authors find that a doubling of FDI in Mexico from the US could decrease total 
migration from Mexico to the US by 1.5 to 2 per cent. Sanderson and Kentor (2008), on the other hand, focus on 
total FDI in 25 LDCs and the net emigration from these LDCs between 1985 and 2000 and argue that inward FDI 
stock from the rest of the world in LDCs increases the net emigration from these countries over time. 
The second set of studies looks at the reverse direction where migration leads to (or affects) capital flows 
(see Gao, 2003; Tong, 2005; Kugler and Rapoport, 2007; Docquier and Lodigiani, 2010; Javorcik et al., 
2011). Gao (2003) finds a positive relationship between the share of Chinese population in source countries of 
FDI and inward FDI in China from those countries. Kugler and Rapoport (2007), with US Census data, study 
immigrants in the US by country of origin and the US FDI abroad to the migrants-sending countries. They show 
that the skilled migration from a country to the US negatively affects FDI outflows from the US to that country. 
Also using data from the US Census in 1990 and 2000, Javorcik et al. (2011)point out that a 1 per cent rise in 
migrants stock in the US leads to a 0.35 to 0.42 per cent increase in US FDI in those migrants-sending countries. 
Employing a broader sample, Docquier and Lodigiani (2010) find that the stock of migrants from LDCs to OECD 
countries and the stock of FDI in LDCs from OECD countries are positively correlated, based on both cross-
sectional and panel models. 
Empirical research on FDI–migration typically does not distinguish between migrants with different levels of 
skills and mainly focuses on FDI and aggregate migration. There are only a few exceptions including Kugler and 
Rapoport (2007), Docquier and Lodigiani (2010) and Javorcik et al. (2011), all of which examine how migration 
leads to FDI. For example, Kugler and Rapport distinguish between migrants with primary, secondary and 
tertiary education, and Javorcik et al. study migrants in the US with at least tertiary education in addition to the 
total number of migrants. 
In contrast, our paper investigates, and to the best of our knowledge is among the first ones to do so, how 
inward FDI affects out-migration by migrants’ level of education. Extending prior research on the effect of FDI on 
migration and complementing Kugler and Rapoport (2007), Docquier and Lodigiani (2010) and Javorcik et al. 
(2011), our analysis aims to shed some light on the empirical evidence of the heterogeneous effects of FDI on 
skilled and unskilled migration. 
Foreign affiliates of multinational corporations (MNCs) can be substantially different from domestic firms. Most 
studies on MNCs point out that there is performance gap between foreign affiliates and domestic firms. For 
example, Howenstine and Zeile (1994) find that the average size of foreign-owned establishments in the US is 
larger, pay higher wages and is more capital-intensive than the US-owned establishments. Similarly, Barba 
Navaretti and Venables (2004), using a larger sample, argue that foreign affiliates of the US, Japan, the UK, 
Germany and France are larger, more capital-intensive and more productive than G5’s domestic 
firms.2 Consequently, inward FDI may favour skilled workers over unskilled workers in a host country by shifting 
the relative demand for skilled and unskilled labour in the host country. Feenstra and Hanson (1996) introduce a 
North–South model where the South has a comparative advantage in producing unskilled labour-intensive 
products initially. As the South is open to capital flows from the North, the demand for skilled labour rises in 
both regions. Feenstra and Hanson (1997) also find that an increase in FDI is positively correlated with the 
increase in demand for high-skilled labour in Mexico and accounts for approximately 50 per cent of the increase 
in the wage for skilled labour in some regions of Mexico. Figini and Görg (1999) examine FDI in the 
manufacturing sector in Ireland and argue that MNCs introduce a higher level of technology in the host country. 
The authors point out that there is a U-shaped relationship between wage inequality and the presence of 
multinationals in Ireland. Similar results are echoed in Driffield and Taylor (2002). Using panel data on FDI in the 
UK, Driffield and Taylor find that FDI in the UK has a positive effect on the relative demand of high-skilled labour, 
hence a positive effect on the employment of high-skilled labour relative to low-skilled labour in manufacturing 
industries. 
Since prospective migrants from a country are not homogeneous in terms of their skills or education levels, we 
should expect FDI to have different effects on the out-migration of individuals with different skills. Using data on 
international migration from 19 LDCs to 14 DCs in 1990 and 2000, we find that FDI stock in LDCs tends to reduce 
the out-migration of individuals with tertiary and secondary education, but not the out-migration of individuals 
with only primary education. Instead, existing community of migrants has a dominant effect on the out-
migration of individuals with primary education. 
We consider this negative relationship between inward FDI and out-migration as the home effect of inward FDI. 
MNCs might offer higher wages than national firms in LDCs, which reduces the wage differential between LDCs 
and DCs. Or, FDI can create job opportunities in LDCs. As a result, prospective migrants in LDCs are more likely to 
stay in their home countries (Borjas, 1999).3 However, the home effect may not be as evident as an increase in 
activities of MNCs may ‘westernise’ LDCs, which in turn builds cultural and ideological links between an LDC and 
the parent country of MNCs (Sassen, 1988, 1993). We refer to this as the linkage effect of FDI, and the linkage 
effect encourages migration. 
We attempt to distinguish between the home effect and the linkage effect in our estimations. Our results 
suggest that inward FDI has a stronger home effect on the out-migration of individuals with tertiary education 
than individuals with secondary education. Yet, the linkage effect seems to be stronger for the migration of 
individuals with secondary education than individuals with tertiary education. 
Our results are of great interest to many LDC governments. Outflows of skilled labour are generally taken as a 
loss of human capital (often called ‘brain drain’) and may become an obstacle to economic growth (Wong and 
Yip, 1999; Beine et al., 2008); therefore, many LDCs typically employ certain migration restrictions to reduce 
such outflows. For instance, in the 1990s, if a Chinese student with a bachelor’s degree planned to come to the 
US, the student either needed to complete a five-year employment obligation in China after obtaining the 
bachelor’s degree or had to pay a ‘fine’ to the Ministry of Education. Although government policies might be 
effective in limiting skilled labour outflows temporarily, the creation of economic incentives through the 
operation of market forces, such as inward FDI, would be the more effective way to retain skilled workers in 
their home countries. 
This research has at least two policy implications. First, immigration policy can focus on how the social and 
demographic characteristics of the population are affected. If we use Jasso and Rosenzweig 
(2006) comprehensive survey of the US as an example, we see that, unlike our study, numerous policy 
interventions treat human capital as a secondary or non-existent concern. These findings suggest policy 
implications will need to expand to include the interaction of investment on existing policy. 
Second, and related to FDI and human capital considerations, is how they influence many other factors related 
to immigration policy. Testable policy implications of this study could harness the use of data from countries 
that have immigrant surveys, such as the New Immigrant Survey.4 Surveys of this type use a panel design, and 
they allow for a substantial set of potential interactions between the FDI–human capital relation to 
acculturation, family life, financial assets, job history and more. 
The remainder of our paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes potential links between FDI on 
international migration; Section 3 introduces our empirical specification and data; Section 4 discusses empirical 
results. Conclusions are offered in Section 5. 
2. Foreign Direct Investment And International Migration 
Neoclassical economic theory suggests that income or economic differentials across countries play a significant 
role in individuals’ decision regarding migration as prospective migrants invariably compare benefits and costs of 
migrating to a foreign country. In other words, an individual takes into consideration expected earnings in the 
home country, expected earnings in the destination country, risks associated with migration such as living in an 
unfamiliar environment and also the fixed cost of the trip (Massey and Espinosa, 1997). 
Conceptually, FDI can affect international migration through two channels (Sassen, 1988, 1993; Sauvant et al., 
1993; Sanderson and Kentor, 2008). First, FDI can directly influence the likelihood of migration by changing 
employment opportunities in the home country and wage differentials between the home country and the 
destination country for prospective migrants. In addition, FDI can indirectly affect international migration 
through its impact on macroeconomic conditions, especially the economic development in the home country of 
prospective migrants. We will name these the ‘home effect’ when we discuss our empirical results. In general, if 
FDI improves the macroeconomic conditions of a country, it should decrease the likelihood of out-migration. 
Second, FDI may strengthen the links between countries and help potential migrants better understand the 
culture and ideologies in the parent country of MNCs (the destination country for migrants), which encourages 
migration. This will be referred to as the ‘linkage effect’ in our future empirical discussions, and linkage effect 
tends to increase the likelihood of migration. 
Borjas (1999) point out that inflows of foreign capital should increase the marginal product of labour as well as 
provide more employment opportunities, thus reducing the necessity of out-migration. The total foreign 
employment by affiliates of MNCs has been rising steadily over time, with an average growth rate of 5.5 per cent 
over the period of 1990–95, 9.8 per cent over the period of 1996–2000 and 6.7 per cent over the period of 
2001–05. United Nations (2010) estimates that in 2009, the total foreign employment of MNCs reached 79.8 
million, compared to 24.5 million in 1990. In some LDCs, the employment effect of FDI can be considerable. 
For example, the employment by maquiladoras accounted for 16 per cent of the total employment in 
manufacturing industries in Mexico in 1991 and 22.4 per cent in 2006 (United Nations, 1992; Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas, 2010). 
In addition, wages offered by MNCs tend to be higher than wages offered by domestic firms. On average, the 
annual nominal wage offered by non-bank majority-owned affiliates of US MNCs in different host countries 
increased by 105 per cent between 1989 and 2004 to $25,719 (Bureau of Economic Analysis 1989, 2004). The 
difference between wages offered by foreign affiliates of MNCs and national firms in LDCs is often striking. In 
Kenya, the wage offered by foreign service affiliates can be 75 per cent higher than wage offered by domestic 
service firms (Sauvant et al., 1993). As a result, there might be less incentive for international migration given a 
reduced wage differential between home and destination countries. Besides the better income prospects, the 
lion’s share of employees in foreign affiliates, including employees at the management level, are recruited 
locally. Sauvant et al. (1993) argue that FDI can also influence out-migration by changing prospective migrants’ 
expectations of professional achievement. The upward mobility or expectations of merit-based advancement in 
foreign firms, which are considered more stable than national firms, can also serve as an incentive for individuals 
to stay in the home country rather than engage in out-migration. 
As recognised by most researchers, income differentials across countries are quite persistent, and the gap 
between high-income countries and low-income countries indeed has been widening over time. According to 
the World Bank, the real GDP per capita in high-income OECD countries rose from $17,913 in 1984 to $28,191 in 
2006 (a 57 per cent increase), while the real GDP per capita in low-income countries rose from $250 to $345 (a 
38 per cent increase). Such a persistent income differential brings about potential for international migration, 
and a low GDP per capita tends to be associated with a high out-migration rate. For example, the GDP per 
capita of El Salvador was approximately 8 per cent of the US GDP per capita in 1990, and the ratio of migrants 
from El Salvador in the US to the total population in El Salvador in 1990 was 4.93 per cent. The real GDP per 
capita of Spain in 1990 was 42 per cent of the US, and the ratio of migrants of Spain in the US to the total 
population in Spain was only 0.05 per cent (Department of Homeland Security, 1995; Maddison, 2003). 
To narrow the income gap, which contributes to international migration, LDCs need to improve their economic 
growth rate. The World Bank categorises low-income countries as countries with a per capita gross national 
income (GNI) of $975 or less and upper-middle-income countries as countries with a per capita GNI of $3,856 or 
higher. For a low-income country with a constant economic growth rate of 5 per cent, it will take approximately 
30 years for the country to become an upper-middle-income country; if a low-income country can have a 10 
per cent economic growth rate, the time needed for this country to become an upper-middle-income country 
will be decreased in half to 14 years.5 
Economic development is a complicated process, but in general, classical and new growth theories predict that 
physical capital accumulation and technological improvements are twin engines of economic growth (Solow, 
1957; Romer, 1994). FDI has long been considered a vehicle transferring not only physical capital but also 
intangible assets such as better product design and better management skills. Consequently, FDI may also have 
a positive impact on macroeconomic conditions in LDCs, specifically economic growth, and in turn reduces 
international migration.6 
In contrast, Sassen (1988, 1993) believes that capital mobility and internationalisation of production are actually 
migration-inducing factors. As Sassen (1993, p. 74) states, ‘[m]igrations do not just happen; they are produced. 
And migrations do not involve just any possible combination of countries; they are patterned’. Capital inflows 
have generated new conditions for international labour mobility; that is, rather than deterring out-migration, 
FDI has precisely the opposite effect. In manufacturing industries, as FDI ‘exports’ manufacturing jobs from DCs 
to LDCs, it can disrupt local communities and draw new segments into the labour force, particularly young 
women. This not only creates internal migration flows from rural to urban areas in LDCs, but also a ‘mobilised’ 
population that can migrate to foreign countries. Sassen shows that starting in the 1960s, there was a dramatic 
upsurge in migration from countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia together with large flows of US 
investments into those regions. 
Furthermore, FDI from industrialised countries to LDCs may ‘westernise’ their local employees and increase 
cultural and ideological distances between their local employees and their home communities. As a result, when 
these local employees leave affiliates of MNCs, they are less willing to return to their communities of origin. 
Instead, migrating to foreign countries becomes a better option given their cultural and ideological linkages with 
DCs. In summary, according to Sassen (1988), globalisation or increased international capital flows has created 
pools of people who can migrate as well as linkages between DCs and LDCs. 
3. Empirical Specification and Data Description 
A. Empirical Specification 
Our study focuses on the relation between FDI and international migration in LDCs. Countries included in the 
sample and the time span of the study are solely determined by data availability. Our empirical specification 
takes the following form (see also Sanderson and Kentor, 2008): 
(1) 
where  is the change in migration stock from country j to country i by education level e between 
1990 and 2000. We use the migration data from Docquier and Marfouk (2004), which will be discussed in detail 
in the following section. Our main control variable of interest, FDIij,1990, is the inward FDI stock in country j from 
country i as of 1990.7 Z represents a vector of other control variables capturing relative benefits and costs of 
migration (Greenwood, 1997; Massey and Espinosa, 1997). Variables included in Z will also be described below. 
We focus on the migration from LDCs to DCs for two reasons. First, the pattern of migration from LDCs to DCs 
can be qualitatively different from the pattern of migration from LDCs to DCs. Second, as mentioned previously, 
LDCs generally have more concerns over the out-migration of individuals, especially the out-migration of 
individuals with higher education. Although it is difficult to perfectly define DCs and LDCs, high-income OECD 
countries will serve as a group of DCs in this study based on income and other factors such as political conditions 
and infrastructure.8 Other countries are LDCs. 
B. MIGRATION AND FDI VARIABLES 
The empirical literature of international migration has been slow to develop due to a lack of quality 
data. Carrington and Detragiache (1998) point out that the main obstacles are insufficient data and inconsistent 
records. They made the first major attempt to estimate the migration rates in LDCs by three different education 
levels. Docquier and Marfouk (2004)extend and improve upon the pioneering work of Carrington and 
Detragiache by estimating migration from home countries to individual OECD destination countries in 1990 and 
2000 with information on education levels of the migrants. Docquier and Marfouk define the stock of emigrants 
from a home country as individuals aged 25 and above with a certain level of education and born in the home 
country but living in another country as of 1990 and 2000. They separate the migrants by three levels of 
education, namely primary, secondary and tertiary education.9 However, they do not consider emigrants’ 
occupation, where the education took place or when the migrants arrived in the country of destination. Their 
estimates cover about 88.8 per cent of the OECD stock of adult immigrants in 1990 and 92.7 per cent in 2000. 
To better assess the magnitude of migration, Docquier and Marfouk (2004) standardise the stock of emigrants 
with a certain level of education by the total population with the same level of education in the emigrants’ home 
country in 1990 and 2000, respectively. In other words, the migration from country j to country i is measured as: 
 
where: t = 1990 and 2000, e = {primary, secondary and tertiary education};  is the number of 
individuals aged 25 years or above as of year t with education level e, who live in country i, but who were born 
in country j;  stands for the total population in country jin year t with education level e. This 
ratio  captures the relative magnitude of migration from country j to country i.10 Docquier 
and Marfouk emphasise the migration measure when e = tertiary education as it represents the magnitude 
of the ‘brain drain’. In our paper, we look at the migration measure for all three different levels of education. 
The migration data in Docquier and Marfouk (2004) can be obtained from the Research Program for 
International Migration & Development from World Bank. 
 
As mentioned previously, our dependent variable in the regressions is the change in migration stock, that 
is: . The migration data in Docquier and Marfouk 
(2004) measure the migrants stock as of 1990 or 2000. So they do not represent the actual migration that 
occurred in 1990 or 2000. People who migrated from j to i before 1990 are included in 
both  and . To provide an accurate estimation of the effect of FDI on 
international migration, we take the difference between  and , so that we 
can focus on the net migration that occurred between 1990 and 2000 from j to i and how inward FDI affects this 
change. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is the expression of interest in ownership and control by a foreign investor in 
an existing enterprise. The Bureau of Economic Analysis defines this interest as the foreign investor acquiring at 
least 10 per cent ownership of the domestic enterprise. The same numerical guideline is used by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). In our study, the FDI variable is measured as the level of inward FDI stock in 
country j from country i. The advantages of employing FDI stock over FDI flows are twofold. 
First, as the FDI stock is a cumulative measure of FDI flows over years, it provides a better estimate of the long-
term effect of FDI on international migration. Second, short-term flows can fluctuate markedly from one year to 
another, which lead to very different results of the impact of FDI on migration. FDI stock is more stable and 
generates more reliable results. To better assess the importance of FDI in a host country, our FDI stock measure 
is standardised as a share of country j’s GDP. Data on FDI stock are obtained from the International Direct 
Investment Statistics database from SourceOECD. 
Based on the data availability of migration stock in both 1990 and 2000 and bilateral FDI in 1990, we are able to 
obtain a sample of 14 OECD countries as destination countries and 19 LDCs as home countries with 82 
observations. Most LDCs in our sample have out-migration to three or five destination countries. Given that 
none of the 19 LDCs dominate others in terms of migration flows, a potential over-representation of some home 
countries should not be a concern in our sample. Consequently, our empirical results will not be distorted by the 
out-migration pattern of one or two LDCs. A list of these countries is provided in Table A1 in the Appendix A. 
C. Other Control Variables 
Generally speaking, individuals tend to migrate to a foreign country with better income prospects, better 
employment opportunities or more stable economic and political regimes. We include variables related to such 
economic and political conditions in the Z vector. These variables represent the ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors 
commonly used in the international migration literature (Greenwood and McDowell, 1991; Obstfeld and 
Rogoff, 1996; Aroca and Maloney, 2005). They refer to pull-factors in the country of destination that attract 
migrants and push-factors that drive people to leave the home country. Our included economic factors are as 
follows: the income level in the destination country and the home country (income destination, income home), 
unemployment rate (unemployment destination, unemployment home) and inflation rate (inflation destination, 
inflation home). 
A key factor explaining international migration is the income gap between the home country and the destination 
country. Consequently, a large out-migration tends to be associated with a low home income and a high foreign 
income. The unemployment rate can represent the availability of jobs in home and destination countries. A high 
unemployment rate in the home country and a low unemployment rate in the destination country indicate that 
there might be a large pool of prospective migrants who are not able to find jobs at home and are potentially 
attracted by the abundant job opportunities in the country of destination. The inflation rate can affect the 
perceived relative benefit of migration. A high inflation in the home country and a low inflation rate in the 
destination country decrease the purchasing power of home income relative to the purchasing power of foreign 
income for prospective migrants and thus induce out-migration. The income level is measured as the log value 
of real GDP per capita. The inflation rate is defined as the percentage change in the consumer price index. These 
data are obtained from World Development Indicators (WDIs) published by the World Bank, World Economic 
Outlook (WEO) series published by the IMF and the International Labor Organisation (ILO) database operated by 
the ILO Bureau of Statistics. We also include a trade openness variable (openness) in our empirical study, which 
is measured by the bilateral trade value between country i and j as a share of country j’s GDP. Sanderson and 
Kentor (2008) use trade value to measure the extent to which a country is integrated into the world economy. 
The bilateral trade data come from the Monthly International Trade database from the OECD.11 
Our political condition variable is a measure of political freedom (political freedom). It is an average of two 
scores on political rights and civil liberties. The data are collected from different issues of Freedom in the World, 
published by the Freedom House (http://www.freedomhouse.org). Countries whose combined average ratings 
for political rights and civil liberties fall between 1.0 and 2.5 are designated ‘free’; between 3.0 and 5.5 ‘partly 
free’; and between 5.5 and 7.0 ‘not free’. Therefore, a lower average score represents political freedom, and a 
higher average score indicates that the country has less political freedom. We take a log difference of political 
freedom between the home country and the destination country to obtain a measure of relative political 
freedom. The larger the value of this variable, the more political freedom the destination country has relative to 
the home country. We expect the relative political freedom to have a positive impact on the out-migration from 
home because more political freedom or a better democratic system in the destination country tends to attract 
migrants. In addition, countries with better political rights and civil liberties may have less restrictive 
immigration policies. 
Certain cultural and geographical variables are also included in our study as proxies for risks associated with 
migration and the cost of moving – the log value of the distance between the home country and the destination 
country (distance); whether home and destination countries share a common language (common language); 
whether the home country and the destination country share a common border (common border); whether a 
country is landlocked (landlock destination, landlock home); and geographical location dummies for countries in 
our sample. The data are from Centre D’Etudes Prospectives Et D’Informations Internationales (CEPII). Common 
language and common border are dummy variables taking the value of one if the home country and the 
destination country share a common language or share a common border, respectively, zero 
otherwise.12 Similarly, landlock is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the country is landlocked, zero 
otherwise. The distance between two countries is typically used as a proxy for the fixed cost of a trip. So a long 
distance between the home country and the destination country tends to reduce international migration. Home 
and destination countries that share a common border or a common language may also share a similar culture. 
Prospective migrants will not feel that they are in a completely new environment and are more likely to stay and 
obtain a good job in the destination country. In addition, sharing a common border means a short distance 
between the home country and the destination country. 
We expect that a common border and a common language both increase the likelihood of migration. We use 
the landlock dummy variable as a measure for general ease of transportation. As Sassen (1988) argues, seaports 
that facilitate the transportation of goods from one country to another can also facilitate the movement of 
people. We expect that a non-landlocked country might have more out-migration than a landlocked country, 
and similarly, a non-landlocked destination country might receive more migrants than a landlocked destination 
country. Summary statistics for all variables are provided in Table 1. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Tertiary education migration1990 0.0222 0.0775 0 0.6748 
Secondary education migration1990 0.0027 0.0059 0 0.0311 
Primary education migration1990 0.0020 0.0067 0 0.0479 
Tertiary education migration2000 0.0167 0.0534 0 0.4555 
Secondary education migration2000 0.0029 0.0054 0 0.0253 
Primary education migration2000 0.0018 0.0056 0 0.0388 
FDI1990 0.0224 0.0845 0 0.7322 
Political Freedom −0.9188 0.4148 −1.9459 0 
Distance (in log) 8.7933 0.7964 5.7834 9.8152 
Common language 0.1829 0.3890 0 1 
Common border 0.0122 0.1104 0 1 
Landlock destination 0.0488 0.2167 0 1 
Landlock source 0.1463 0.3556 0 1 
Income1990 destination (in log) 10.070 0.3232 8.9831 10.735 
Income1990 source (in log) 7.9637 0.9309 5.8587 9.7925 
Unemployment1990 destination (%) 6.3695 2.5467 0.5000 11.400 
Unemployment1990 source (%) 6.1354 3.3423 1.7000 15.800 
Trade1990 0.0034 0.0066 0 0.0403 
Inflation1990 destination (%) 5.2955 2.1527 2.4540 10.377 
Inflation1990 source (%) 484.56 993.92 2.6180 2947.7 
Notes: 
(i) FDI, foreign direct investment. 
(ii) The variables of tertiary education migration, secondary education migration and primary education 
migration represent the individuals 25 years of age or above with tertiary, secondary and primary education, 
respectively, who were born in the source country and live in the destination country relative to the population 
in the source country. The migration data are from Docquier and Marfouk (2004). (iii) The FDI variable is 
measured as the level of inward FDI stock in the source country from the destination country. (iv) The data are 
from the International Direct Investment Statistics database (OECD). (v) Political freedom is a log difference of 
political freedom between the home country and the destination country. The data are collected from different 
issues of Freedom in the World. (vi) The distance variable is defined as distance (in log) between two countries’ 
most important cities (in terms of population). (vii) Common language, common border, landlock destination 
and landlock source are dummy variables. They are obtained from Centre D’Etudes Prospectives El 
D’Informations Internationales (CEPII). (viii) The variables of income (real GDP per capita), unemployment rates, 
trade openness and inflation rates are from the World Development Indicators. 
4. Empirical Estimation and Results 
Before presenting our empirical results, we mention a few general estimation issues. First, we use the seemingly 
unrelated regressions (SUR) technique for estimation. Our SUR system includes three regressions. Dependent 
variables in these three regressions are change of migration of individuals with tertiary education, secondary 
education and primary education, respectively. The SUR system estimates several regressions simultaneously, 
allowing for potential correlation among the error terms. Given that there can be some unobserved factors that 
affect the out-migration of individuals with different levels of education at the same time, SUR is an appropriate 
technique for our model. Second, heteroscedasticity can be important across countries, and all our estimates 
use White-adjusted standard errors. 
As mentioned previously, there is no reverse causality for our cross-sectional model given the time lag between 
measures of our dependent and independent variables (see also Docquier and Lodigiani, 2010). Several control 
variables in the regression are time-invariant, such as distance and geographical contiguity. As a result, the 
coefficients on those variables should not suffer from endogeneity caused by the existence of unobservable 
factors influencing migration. With that said, to better identify the effect of our main variable of interest and 
control for endogeneity due to the existence of unobservables affecting both migration and FDI, an 
instrumentation methodology is also adopted (Rajan and Subramanian, 2008).13 For comparison, we report 
empirical results of both regular SUR and three-stage least squares (3SLS). However, our discussion is mainly 
based on estimated coefficients from 3SLS. 
A. The Effects Of Fdi And Social Capital On International Migration 
 
Table 2 contains the results of the estimation of equation (1). We refer to the three regressions in the SUR and 
3SLS systems by different levels of education as tertiary regression, secondary regression and primary 
regression. Panel A presents results of the tertiary regression with different specifications. All control variables 
have the expected signs. Political freedom, income in the destination country and openness are significant 
factors affecting migration of individuals with tertiary education. We provide corresponding secondary and 
primary regression results in panels B and C, respectively. The estimated coefficients on control variables are 
qualitatively similar to those in the tertiary regressions. In the interest of brevity, we only report the estimated 
coefficients on FDI in panels B and C. Other coefficients from secondary and primary regressions are available 
upon request. 
Table 2. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Migration with Different Levels of Education 
  SUR1 SUR2 SUR3 SUR4 SUR5 3SLS1 3SLS2 3SLS3 3SLS4 3SLS5 
Panel A: Tertiary 
education migration 
          
 FDI1990 −0.28134
*** 
(0.01352
) 
−0.29303
*** 
(0.01245
) 
−0.28069
*** 
(0.01368
) 
−0.281
40*** 
(0.013
51) 
−0.283
34*** 
(0.014
37) 
−0.2760
5*** 
(0.017) 
−0.2900
2*** 
(0.016) 
−0.275
07*** 
(0.018
) 
−0.275
20*** 
(0.017
) 
−0.27
943**
* 
(0.019
) 
 Common language 0.00029  
(0.00305
) 
−0.00331
  
(0.00289
) 
0.00065  
(0.00311
) 
0.0002
5  
(0.003
05) 
0.0001
8  
(0.003
11) 
0.0000  
(0.003) 
−0.0035
3  
(0.003) 
0.0004
  
(0.003
) 
−0.000
08  
(0.003
) 
0.000
07  
(0.003
) 
 Distance −0.00173
  
(0.00155
) 
−0.00055
  
(0.00144
) 
−0.00189
  
(0.00168
) 
−0.001
55  
(0.001
60) 
−0.001
8  
(0.001
57) 
−0.0019
5  
(0.002) 
−0.0005
8  
(0.001) 
−0.002
18  
(0.002
) 
−0.001
77  
(0.002
) 
−0.00
2  
(0.002
) 
 Political freedom 0.00549* 
(0.00294
) 
0.00919*
** 
(0.00277
) 
0.00501  
(0.00306
) 
0.0054
4* 
(0.002
94) 
0.0060
9* 
(0.003
11) 
0.00536
* 
(0.003) 
0.00929
*** 
(0.003) 
0.0047
8  
(0.003
) 
0.0053
1* 
(0.003
) 
0.005
77* 
(0.003
) 
 Landlock destination −0.00784
  
(0.00585
) 
−0.00314
  
(0.00540
) 
−0.00789
  
(0.00584
) 
−0.008
83  
(0.006
29) 
−0.007
27  
(0.006
08) 
−0.0080
8  
(0.006) 
−0.0028
6  
(0.005) 
−0.008
13  
(0.006
) 
−0.008
92  
(0.006
) 
−0.00
781  
(0.006
) 
 Landlock source −0.00064
  
(0.00295
) 
−0.00304
  
(0.00270
) 
−0.0002  
(0.00305
) 
−0.000
69  
(0.002
95) 
−0.000
49  
(0.002
97) 
−0.0005
5  
(0.003) 
−0.0028
6  
(0.003) 
−0.000
01  
(0.003
) 
−0.000
59  
(0.003
) 
−0.00
046  
(0.003
) 
 Income1990 
destination 
0.01196*
** 
(0.00380
) 
0.00972*
* 
(0.00383
) 
0.01115*
* 
(0.00515
) 
0.0119
4*** 
(0.003
79) 
0.0126
0*** 
(0.003
95) 
0.01200
*** 
(0.004) 
0.00955
** 
(0.004) 
0.0113
0** 
(0.005
) 
0.0119
5*** 
(0.004
) 
0.012
41*** 
(0.004
) 
 Income1990 home −0.00146
  
(0.00135
) 
−0.00276
** 
(0.00127
) 
−0.00157
  
(0.00137
) 
−0.001
49  
(0.001
35) 
−0.001
43  
(0.001
49) 
−0.0015
1  
(0.001) 
−0.0026
9** 
(0.001) 
−0.001
64  
(0.001
) 
−0.001
55  
(0.001
) 
−0.00
144  
(0.002
) 
 
Unemployment1990destina
tion 
−0.00071
  
(0.00047
) 
−0.00027
  
(0.00045
) 
−0.00075
  
(0.00050
) 
−0.000
72  
(0.000
47) 
−0.000
66  
(0.000
49) 
−0.0007
  
(0.000) 
−0.0002
6  
(0.000) 
−0.000
73  
(0.001
) 
−0.000
71  
(0.000
) 
−0.00
067  
(0.000
) 
 Unemployment1990 
home 
−0.00024
  
(0.00035
) 
0.00003  
(0.00032
) 
−0.00022
  
(0.00035
) 
−0.000
21  
(0.000
36) 
−0.000
23  
(0.000
37) 
−0.0002
5  
(0.000) 
0.00009
  
(0.000) 
−0.000
23  
(0.000
) 
−0.000
23  
(0.000
) 
−0.00
023  
(0.000
) 
 Trade1990 – 0.82906*
** 
(0.18519
) 
– – – – 0.84127
*** 
(0.191) 
– – – 
 Inflation1990 
destination 
– – −0.00013
  
(0.00071
) 
– – – – −0.000
1  
(0.001
) 
– – 
 Inflation1990 home – – 0.00000  
(0.00000
) 
– – – – 0.0000
  
(0.000
) 
– – 
 Common border – – – 0.0048
8  
(0.011
38) 
– – – – 0.0043
9  
(0.011
) 
– 
 Constant −0.08141
** 
(0.037) 
−0.06169
  
(0.040) 
−0.07102
  
(0.051) 
−0.082
63** 
(0.037
) 
−0.086
65** 
(0.038
) 
−0.0797
0** 
(0.037)  
−0.0609
5  
(0.040)  
−0.070
06  
(0.052
)  
−0.080
55** 
(0.037
)  
−0.08
347** 
(0.039
) 
 Observations 82 81 82 82 82 80 79 80 80 80 
 R2 0.8699 0.8959 0.8705 0.8702 0.8705 0.871 0.898 0.8717 0.8711 0.871
4 
Panel B: Secondary 
education migration 
          
 FDI1990 −0.00892
*** 
(0.00183
) 
−0.00922
*** 
(0.00186
) 
−0.00833
*** 
(0.00181
) 
−0.008
96*** 
(0.001
77) 
−0.008
97*** 
(0.001
92) 
−0.0082
9*** 
(0.002) 
−0.0082
3*** 
(0.002) 
−0.007
10*** 
(0.002
) 
−0.007
80*** 
(0.002
) 
−0.00
762**
* 
(0.002
) 
 R2 0.3084 0.3262 0.3402 0.3527 0.3276 0.3162 0.3335 0.3467 0.3582 0.339
1 
Panel C: Primary 
education migration 
          
 FDI1990 −0.01007
*** 
(0.00112
) 
−0.01049
*** 
(0.00112
) 
−0.01018
*** 
(0.00111
) 
−0.010
09*** 
(0.001
09) 
−0.010
80*** 
(0.001
17) 
−0.0105
1*** 
(0.001) 
−0.0109
5*** 
(0.001) 
−0.011
06*** 
(0.001
) 
−0.010
24*** 
(0.001
) 
−0.01
141**
* 
(0.002
) 
 R2 0.6378 0.6564 0.652 0.6578 0.6523 0.6382 0.656 0.6499 0.6586 0.651
8 
Notes: 
(i) Standard errors in brackets. 
(ii) ***, **, *Significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. (iii) SUR5 includes regional dummies (South Asia and 
West European countries). (iv) The set of instrumental variables for the three-stage least squares regressions 
(3SLS) is as follows: the log value of land area in host country, domestic credit provided by banking sector in host 
country as a share of GDP and double taxation treaty, which is a dummy variable indicating a double taxation 
treaty governing ‘income and capital’ in place between host and parent country. 
 
Theoretically, good instruments should be ones correlating with the endogenous variable, but not with the error 
term. In practice, ideal instruments may be hard to find. Following previous literature and also taking into 
consideration of data availability, our instruments for FDI include host country’s land area (Borensztein et al., 
1998), host country’s domestic credit and double taxation treaty signed by the host and home of FDI (di 
Giovanni, 2005; Stein and Daude, 2007). Domestic credit is host domestic credit provided by the banking sector 
as a share of GDP. Double taxation treaty is a dummy variable indicating tax treaty governing income and capital 
in place between host and home countries of FDI.14 We perform several tests to determine whether the 
instruments are valid. The results are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3. Diagnostic Tests on Instrumental Variables 
Variables 3SLS1 3SLS2 3SLS3 3SLS4 3SLS5 
Panel A: First stage for foreign direct 
investment (FDI) 
     
 log(Land area) −0.1794*** 
(0.0251) 
−0.1858*** 
(0.0258) 
−0.1894*** 
(0.0305) 
0.1808*** 
(0.0252) 
−0.1387*** 
(0.0294) 
 log(Land area) squared 0.0070*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0073*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0075*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0071*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0055*** 
(0.0012) 
 Double taxation treaty 0.0226  
(0.0147) 
0.0263* 
(0.0155) 
0.0244* 
(0.0148) 
0.0218  
(0.0147) 
0.0264* 
(0.0142) 
 Domestic credit 0.0007* 
(0.0005) 
0.0008* 
(0.0005) 
0.0007  
(0.0006) 
0.0008* 
(0.0005) 
0.0016*** 
(0.0005) 
 Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 R2 0.6820 0.6908 0.6918 0.6863 0.7092 
 Number of Obs 80 79 80 80 80 
Panel B: Diagnostic tests for the original 
IVs 
     
 F test of excl. inst. 20.29*** 18.97*** 19.77*** 20.42*** 19.80*** 
 Sargan overidentification statistics 14.495 14.675 21.436 16.995 9.162 
 Sargan overidentification p-value 0.2702 0.2597 0.0444 0.1498 0.4225 
Panel C: Exclusion restriction test for 
the original IVsa 
     
 Are the coefficients on the original 
IVs significant in the migration 
regressions? 
No No No No No 
 Sargan overidentification statistics 
for the second set of IVs 
4.012 2.345 3.149 3.132 4.012 
 Sargan overidentification p-value 
for the second set of IVs 
0.2602 0.5040 0.3692 0.3717 0.2602 
Notes: 
(i) Standard errors in brackets. 
(ii) *** and *Significant at 1% and 10%, respectively. (iii) The diagnostic tests are based on the 3SLS regressions 
in Table 2. (iv) The set of instrumental variables is as follows: the log value of land area in host country, domestic 
credit provided by banking sector in host country as a share of GDP, and double taxation treaty which is a 
dummy variable indicating a double taxation treaty governing ‘income and capital’ in place between host and 
parent country. 
(v) aThe second set of instruments for the exclusion restriction test is BERJ and BIT, where BERI is a measure of 
host country business climate based on surveys and published by BERI, Inc, and BIT is a dummy variable 
indicating a bilateral investment treaty in place between host and parent country. The null hypothesis of the 
exclusion restriction is that, conditional on the controls, the first set of instrument variables is not significant in 
the migration regressions. The null hypothesis of the overidentification test is that the second set of 
instrumental variables is exogenous in the migration regressions. 
 
We find a strong first-stage relationship between our instruments and FDI stock (see panel A, Table 3). These 
first-stage regressions show instruments as a group having a significant impact on FDI stock. An F-test can be 
applied to see whether our instruments are relevant. The null hypothesis of this F-test is that coefficients on 
instruments in the first-stage regression are jointly zero. A rule of thumb proposed by Staiger and Stock 
(1997) for instrument as validation is an F-value of 10 or larger for a single endogenous regressor. As shown in 
panel B in Table 3, the F statistics are >10 in all specifications. The first-stage regressions also pass another 
simple rule of thumb, which is that the R2, also known as the Shea partial R2, should be larger than 0.3 (Shea, 
1997). The R2 in our first-stage regressions is around 0.7. 
We apply a test for overidentifying restrictions to determine whether our instruments are uncorrelated with the 
error term in equation (1) (Sargan, 1958). Results of the Sargan overidentification test are also reported in Table 
3, including chi-square statistics and corresponding p-values. The null hypothesis in this case is that the error 
term is uncorrelated with the instruments. The overidentification test results in general show that our 
instruments are orthogonal to the error term in equation (1). 
A final check is a determination that those instruments do not themselves belong in the equation. In other 
words, we should not observe a direct relationship between those instruments and change in migration. To 
implement this test, a second set of instruments is introduced for the purpose of identifying the equation. The 
second set of instruments includes a measure of host business climate published by Business Environment Risk 
Intelligence and a dummy variable indicating whether a bilateral investment treaty is in place between host and 
home of FDI. The IV regression implies that conditional on control variables included in the model, the only 
impact of the original set of instruments on migration should only come through a change in FDI. Results in 
panel C in Table 3 show that the coefficients on the original set of instruments are not significant in the 
migration regressions. It confirms that the original instruments do not have direct effects on migration, but only 
indirect influence on migration through FDI. Sargan overidentification test reported in panel C also shows that 
the second set of instruments is valid. 
Going back to Table 2, the coefficients on the key independent variable, inward FDI, are negative and significant 
at the 1 per cent level in all 30 regressions. The baseline results show that FDI has a robust negative effect on 
migration regardless of the education level of the migrants. As mentioned previously, inward FDI in LDCs can 
reduce out-migration by providing better income prospects for prospective migrants and by improving 
macroeconomic conditions in the host country. We refer this result as the home effect of FDI, which indicates 
prospective migrants are more likely to stay in their home countries (Sauvant et al., 1993; Borjas, 
1999; Sanderson and Kentor, 2008). 
Sobel (2002, p. 139) describes social capital as ‘circumstances in which individuals can use membership in 
groups and networks to secure benefits’. The importance of network effect or social capital has been recognised 
by a number of studies (Massey and Espinosa, 1997; Kanaiaupuni, 2000; Munshi, 2003). As pointed out 
by Massey and Espinosa (1997, p. 951), social capital theory envisions that ‘ties to current or former migrants 
represent a valuable social asset since these connections can be used to acquire information and assistance that 
reduce the costs and risks of (international migration)’. Previous studies mostly use individual survey data to 
assess the impact of connections with relatives and friends who have migratory experience on the decision of 
prospective migrants. Given our data are aggregated at the country level, in Table 4, we include the migration 
from j to i as of 1990 as a measure of the size of existing migrants communities and thus a proxy for social 
network.15 The empirical model with the initial migration is estimated as follows: 
(3) 
Table 4. The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on Migration Controlling for Initial Migration Level 
 
SUR1 SUR2 SUR3 SUR4 SUR5 3SLS1 3SLS2 3SLS3 3SLS4 3SLS5 
Panel A: 
Tertiary 
education 
migration 
          
 FDI1990 −0.07
272**
* 
(0.023
86) 
−0.09
933**
* 
(0.025
18) 
−0.07218
*** 
(0.02377) 
−0.07219
*** 
(0.02380) 
−0.06742
*** 
(0.02371) 
−0.2084
1*** 
(0.041) 
−0.24
281**
* 
(0.043
) 
−0.207
21*** 
(0.041) 
−0.20
747**
* 
(0.041
) 
−0.208
57*** 
(0.043
) 
 Tertiary 
migration199
0 
−0.25
333**
* 
(0.026
64) 
−0.22
815**
* 
(0.027
58) 
−0.25389
*** 
(0.02654) 
−0.25407
*** 
(0.02658) 
−0.26158
*** 
(0.02619) 
−0.1135
2** 
(0.045) 
−0.08
234* 
(0.046
) 
−0.114
87*** 
(0.044) 
−0.11
442** 
(0.044
) 
−0.118
57*** 
(0.046
) 
 R2 0.937
2 
0.942
7 
0.9378 0.9379 0.9404 0.9145 0.923
1 
0.9156 0.915
3 
0.9164 
Panel B: 
Secondary 
education 
migration 
          
 FDI1990 −0.00
603**
* 
(0.001
92) 
−0.00
652**
* 
(0.001
95) 
−0.00561
*** 
(0.00189) 
−0.00603
*** 
(0.00185) 
−0.00606
*** 
(0.00204) 
−0.0074
2*** 
(0.002) 
−0.00
793**
* 
(0.002
) 
−0.006
87*** 
(0.002) 
−0.00
730**
* 
(0.002
) 
−0.007
66*** 
(0.002
) 
 
Secondary 
migration199
0 
−0.10
295**
* 
(0.026
77) 
−0.09
725**
* 
(0.026
96) 
−0.10036
*** 
(0.02569) 
−0.10465
*** 
(0.02632) 
−0.10481
*** 
(0.02925) 
−0.0776
1*** 
(0.027) 
−0.06
987** 
(0.027
) 
−0.075
28*** 
(0.026) 
−0.08
028**
* 
(0.027
) 
−0.074
45** 
(0.030
) 
 R2 0.349
8 
0.367 0.3747 0.4008 0.3492 0.3667 0.383
6 
0.3937 0.417
2 
0.3719 
Panel C: 
Primary 
education 
migration 
          
 FDI1990 −0.00
14  
(0.001
22) 
−0.00
195  
(0.001
24) 
−0.00135
  
(0.00117) 
−0.00163
  
(0.00119) 
−0.00189
  
(0.00121) 
−0.0012  
(0.001) 
−0.00
156  
(0.001
) 
−0.001
32  
(0.001) 
−0.00
136  
(0.001
) 
−0.001
86  
(0.001
) 
 Primary 
migration199
0 
−0.16
922**
* 
(0.016
98) 
−0.16
333**
* 
(0.017
09) 
−0.16993
*** 
(0.01600) 
−0.16510
*** 
(0.01676) 
−0.17302
*** 
(0.01642) 
−0.1720
1*** 
(0.018) 
−0.16
824**
* 
(0.018
) 
−0.170
92*** 
(0.017) 
−0.16
889**
* 
(0.018
) 
−0.173
15*** 
(0.018
) 
 R2 0.787
2 
0.795 0.8038 0.8026 0.804 0.7864 0.793
2 
0.8037 0.801
3 
0.8044 
 
Observation
s 
82 81 82 82 82 80 79 80 80 80 
Notes: 
(i) Standard errors in brackets. 
(ii) ***, **, *Significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. (iii) SUR1 includes control variables: common language, 
distance, political freedom, landlocked, income and unemployment; SUR2 includes the control variables in SURI 
and trade; SUR3 includes the control variables in SUR1 and inflation; SUR4 includes the control variables in SURl 
and common border; SUR5 includes the control variables in SUR1 and regional dummies (South Asia and West 
European countries). (iv) The set of instrumental variables for the three-stage least squares regressions (3SLS) is 
as follows: the log value of land area in host country, domestic credit provided by banking sector in host country 
as a share of GDP and double taxation treaty, which is a dummy variable indicating a double taxation treaty 
governing ‘income and capital’ in place between host and parent country. 
 
Overall, the results from Table 4 indicate that, after controlling for the existing social network for prospective 
migrants, inward FDI tends to have a stronger home effect on the out-migration of individuals with tertiary 
education than on the out-migration of individuals with secondary education. With the addition of the social 
network proxy, panel A 3SLS shows the estimate of the coefficient on FDI in tertiary regressions is negative and 
significant, ranging from −0.24 to −0.20. Similarly, the secondary regression results from panel B show the 
coefficient on FDI is negative and statistically different from zero. The magnitude of the coefficient on FDI in the 
secondary regressions is between −0.0079 and −0.0069. In absolute value, the FDI coefficient in the secondary 
regressions is significantly smaller than in the tertiary regressions. The coefficient on FDI in primary regressions 
in panel C is negative, but is estimated imprecisely. Although inward FDI has a negative home effect in tertiary 
and secondary regressions, it does not seem to affect the out-migration of individuals with primary education. 
After we control for the effect of social capital, the deterrent effect of inward FDI on out-migration is much 
stronger for tertiary and secondary migration than for primary migration. 
Taking a closer look at the effect of FDI on the migration of individuals with tertiary and secondary education, 
3SLS1 in panel A suggests that a 1 per cent increase in inward FDI stock as a share of GDP from country i to 
country j tends to decrease the migration of individuals with tertiary education from j to i by 0.2 per cent, ceteris 
paribus. Given the sample mean of migration of individuals with tertiary education (relative to total population 
with tertiary education in the home country j) at 1.66 per cent in 2000, a 0.2 per cent change is equivalent to 12 
per cent of the sample mean. Similarly, 3SLS1 in panel B indicates that a 1 per cent increase in inward FDI tends 
to decrease future migration of individuals with secondary education by 0.0074 per cent, holding other things 
constant. The sample average of migration of individuals with secondary education in 2000 is 0.294 per cent, 
and this change is equivalent to 2.5 per cent of the sample mean. 
The deterrent effect of inward FDI on tertiary and secondary migration is consistent with the findings from 
previous studies on FDI (Howenstine and Zeile, 1994; Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004), which indicate that 
foreign affiliates are more productive than domestic firms. If inward FDI transfers intangible assets and is 
correlated with an increase in demand for high-skilled labour (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 1997), individuals 
with tertiary or secondary education may be likely to be employed by affiliates of MNCs and take advantage of 
the higher wages and better job opportunities than individuals with only primary education. Therefore, inward 
FDI should have a stronger (negative) home effect on tertiary migration or secondary migration than primary 
migration. As the Development Gateway Foundation states in its website, ‘the migration of skilled and educated 
individuals from one nation to another, is first and foremost a response to lack of opportunities at home. In 
recent years, countries like India and China, which have exported their brightest for decades, have started to 
reverse this trend. Outsourcing [FDI] is said to have played a large role by creating jobs, raising incomes and 
generating disciplined, efficient workforce that have in turn provided a platform for economic growth’.16 
Furthermore, we note that the migration from j to i as of 1990 is positively correlated with migration as of 2000 
from j to i, which is consistent with prior research on the relation between social capital and international 
migration. 
According to equation (3), the actual effect of migration as of 1990 on migration as of 2000 would be 1 + 
γ.17 The estimates from 3SLS1 in panel A in Table 4 indicate that initial tertiary migration is positively correlated 
with future tertiary migration with a magnitude of 0.88. In other words, the more former migrants who leave 
from country of origin j to destination country i, the easier will be future migration from j to i due to a stronger 
social network.18 The positive social network effect is robust across different specifications, regardless of the 
education levels. The estimated coefficients on migration1990 suggest that the magnitude of such effect is from 
0.88 to 0.91 for tertiary regressions, 0.91 to 0.93 for secondary regressions and 0.74 to 0.83 for primary 
regressions. 
According to these estimates, the positive social network effect is stronger for migration of individuals 
with secondary or primary education than for migration of individuals with tertiary education. It implies that the 
decisions of prospective migrants with relatively lower levels of education rely more on an existing community 
of migrants (with a similar education level) in the destination country than the decisions of prospective migrants 
with tertiary education. Another interesting result from these regressions is that social network seems to be a 
more important factor influencing the out-migration of individuals with primary education than FDI. Possible ties 
with former migrants in the destination country have a strong positive impact on the future primary education 
out-migration from the home country, but inward FDI in the home country may not necessarily have a 
significant impact. 
B. Separating Home And Linkage Effects Of Fdi 
Our previous results show that inward FDI can reduce out-migration from its host countries. However, some 
studies, such as, Sassen (1988, 1993), also suggest that FDI can induce international migration as it creates 
cultural and ideological connections between the home country and the destination country (linkage effect). 
As a result, the coefficient on the FDI variable in our previous regressions might not solely measure the home 
effect. Instead, it reflects the relative strength of linkage and home effects. To better distinguish between these 
two effects, ideally one would conduct a survey study asking prospective and existing migrants about their 
motivations of migration, which is beyond the scope of our current study. Alternatively, we attempt to 
distinguish between home and linkage effects, albeit indirectly, by including a square term of FDI ( ) in 
our model: 
(4) 
The squared term allows us to capture any change in the effect of FDI on migration as the level of FDI changes. 
As a result, we can compare the relative strength of the home effect and the linkage effect. The results are 
shown in Table 5. 
Table 5. The Impacts of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and FDI Squared on Migration 
 
SURI SUR2 SUR3 SUR4 SUR5 3SLS1 3SLS2 3SLS3 3SLS4 3SLS5 
Panel A: 
Tertiary 
educatio
n 
migration 
          
 FDI1990 0.013
34  
(0.040
17) 
−0.04
725  
(0.05
953) 
0.02169  
(0.04019) 
0.01445
  
(0.0399
4) 
0.01811  
(0.0415
0) 
−0.026
17  
(0.080) 
−0.14
7  
(0.145
) 
0.00208
  
(0.079) 
−0.02
436  
(0.079
) 
−0.01
661  
(0.090
) 
 FDI1990 
squared 
−0.17
826** 
(0.072
17) 
−0.08
598  
(0.09
797) 
−0.19650
*** 
(0.07257) 
−0.1795
3** 
(0.0717
9) 
−0.1724
9** 
(0.0738
7) 
−0.333
84** 
(0.132) 
−0.15
068  
(0.226
) 
−0.3908
6*** 
(0.132) 
−0.32
955** 
(0.130
) 
−0.33
582** 
(0.146
) 
 
Tertiary 
migration
1990 
−0.20
832**
* 
(0.033
42) 
−0.21
712**
* 
(0.03
362) 
−0.20297
*** 
(0.03329) 
−0.2087
0*** 
(0.0333
0) 
−0.2179
6*** 
(0.0335
3) 
−0.050
13  
(0.051) 
−0.06
666  
(0.053
) 
−0.0362
3  
(0.051) 
−0.05
542  
(0.050
) 
−0.05
843  
(0.051
) 
 R2 0.941
9 
0.943
4 
0.9432 0.9427 0.9445 0.9279 0.928
1 
0.9291 0.929
7 
0.930
7 
Panel B: 
Secondar
y 
educatio
n 
migration 
          
 FDI1990 0.013
20* 
(0.007
48) 
0.022
82** 
(0.01
108) 
0.01358* 
(0.00740) 
0.01377
* 
(0.0071
5) 
0.01444
* 
(0.0078
3) 
0.0185  
(0.013) 
0.031
2  
(0.024
) 
0.02094
* 
(0.013) 
0.020
18* 
(0.012
) 
0.023
45  
(0.015
) 
 FDI1990 
squared 
−0.02
884**
* 
(0.010
69) 
−0.04
207**
* 
(0.01
555) 
−0.02872
*** 
(0.01058) 
−0.0296
9*** 
(0.0102
2) 
−0.0302
5*** 
(0.0109
7) 
−0.036
92** 
(0.018) 
−0.05
429* 
(0.034
) 
−0.0396
8** 
(0.018) 
−0.03
915** 
(0.017
) 
−0.04
321** 
(0.020
) 
 
Secondar
y 
migration
1990 
−0.07
869**
* 
(0.026
78) 
−0.07
092**
* 
(0.02
688) 
−0.07648
*** 
(0.02592) 
−0.0792
5*** 
(0.0262
2) 
−0.0757
9*** 
(0.0289
9) 
−0.060
73** 
(0.027) 
−0.05
169* 
(0.029
) 
−0.0558
8** 
(0.026) 
−0.06
262** 
(0.026
) 
−0.05
445* 
(0.029
) 
 R2 0.410
3 
0.427
1 
0.4343 0.4634 0.415 0.4323 0.448
4 
0.4576 0.485
9 
0.438
8 
Panel C: 
Primary 
educatio
n 
migration 
          
 FDI1990 0.003
85  
(0.003
69) 
0.001
33  
(0.00
545) 
0.00534  
(0.00354) 
0.00407
  
(0.0035
4) 
0.00134  
(0.0037
5) 
0.0082  
(0.007) 
0.010
8  
(0.012
) 
0.00808
  
(0.006) 
0.008
84  
(0.006
) 
0.006
08  
(0.007
) 
 FDI1990 
squared 
−0.00
807  
(0.005
33) 
−0.00
456  
(0.00
767) 
−0.01040
** 
(0.00511) 
−0.0088
8* 
(0.0051
3) 
−0.0047
3  
(0.0053
2) 
−0.013
48  
(0.009) 
−0.01
704  
(0.016
) 
−0.0136
7  
(0.009) 
−0.01
470* 
(0.009
) 
−0.01
094  
(0.010
) 
 
Primary 
migration
1990 
−0.16
289**
* 
(0.017
41) 
−0.16
374**
* 
(0.01
739) 
−0.16038
*** 
(0.01633) 
−0.1566
7*** 
(0.0171
4) 
−0.1709
7*** 
(0.0169
1) 
−0.167
51*** 
(0.018) 
−0.16
658**
* 
(0.018
) 
−0.1642
6*** 
(0.017) 
−0.16
301**
* 
(0.018
) 
−0.17
156**
* 
(0.018
) 
 R2 0.795 0.795
8 
0.8158 0.8119 0.8067 0.7902 0.787
5 
0.8143 0.806
2 
0.803
5 
 
Observati
ons 
82 81 82 82 82 80 79 80 80 80 
Notes: 
(i) Standard errors in brackets. 
(ii) ***, **, *Significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. (iii) SUR1 includes control variables: common language, 
distance, political freedom, landlocked, income and unemployment; SUR2 includes the control variables in SURI 
and trade; SUR3 includes the control variables in SUR1 and inflation; SUR4 includes the control variables in SUR1 
and common border; SUR5 includes the control variables in SURI and regional dummies (South Asia and West 
European countries). (iv) The set of instrumental variables for the three-stage least squares regressions (3SLS) is 
as follows: the log value of land area in host country, domestic credit provided by banking sector in host country 
as a share of GDP and double taxation treaty, which is a dummy variable indicating a double taxation treaty 
governing ‘income and capital’ in place between host and parent country. 
 
We observe from the tertiary regressions in panel A that the coefficient on  is negative and 
significant. The stand-alone FDI is also in general negative, but not significant at conventional levels. It seems 
that for migration of individuals with tertiary education, we only observe a much stronger home effect of inward 
FDI (represented by a significantly negative coefficient on ). The linkage effect may not be discernible 
as it is expected to be represented by a positive coefficient on the stand-alone FDI. In other words, inward FDI is 
more likely to decrease the migration of individuals with tertiary education. 
In panel B for the secondary migration regressions, the coefficient on FDI is positive and significant in the SUR 
regressions, but only significant in two out of five 3SLS regressions. The coefficient on the squared FDI is 
negative and significant. It appears that FDI can have a positive effect on migration (that is, the linkage effect 
exceeds the home effect). Conceptually, the net effect of FDI on migration is as 
follows: . Since β is positive and the coefficient on squared FDI is 
negative (i.e. θ > 0), the net effect of FDI on migration ( ) can be either positive or 
negative depending on the existing level of FDI in the host country. 
Taken as a whole, the results in Table 5 show that: (i) inward FDI has a dominant home effecton individuals with 
tertiary education than on individuals with secondary education, and (ii) inward FDI seems to have a 
relatively stronger linkage effect on individuals with secondary education than on individuals with tertiary 
education. In contrast, most coefficients on both the stand-alone FDI and the squared FDI in primary regressions 
(panel C) are not statistically significant. This confirms that inward FDI affects out-migration of individuals with 
tertiary or secondary education, but does not generally have a significant effect on the out-migration of 
individuals with primary education. As mentioned previously, affiliates of MNCs, being more capital-intensive 
and more productive than national firms, tend to favour high-skilled labour to low-skilled labour. Individuals 
with primary education might not be able to obtain the higher-paying jobs and experience the ‘western’ culture 
embodied by the affiliates of MNCs. Thus, FDI does not have a significant influence (either home or linkage 
effect) on out-migration of individuals with primary education. 
These findings again confirm the hypothesis of FDI as a potential source for skill-biased technological change 
(SBTC) suggested by prior research. In general, most LDCs are high-skilled labour scarce and low-skilled labour 
abundant. Although MNCs employ individuals with different levels of education, inward FDI tends to raise 
relative demand for high-skilled labour (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 1997) in LDCs. In turn, a rise in the level of 
inward FDI (or more affiliates of MNCs) in LDCs increases the wage for individuals with tertiary education much 
faster than individuals with secondary (or primary) education. Consequently, we observe a stronger home effect 
of FDI on tertiary migration than on secondary migration. 
C. Fdi From Other Countries 
One may suspect that the effects of FDI might not be limited to a specific country pair. For example, FDI from 
the US to Thailand can affect Thai migration to the US. But FDI in Thailand from other DCs might also affect 
migration from Thailand to the US. To examine this potential effect, we create a variable measuring FDI from 
other countries (OCFDI) and include it in the regression. The OCFDI is constructed as: 
(5) 
where k,i in {high‐income OECD countries} and FDIkj,1990 is the inward FDI stock in country jfrom country k as a 
share of country j’s GDP in 1990. The regression results with this new variable are reported in Table 6. 
Table 6. The Impacts of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Other Countries’ FDI on Migration 
  SURI SUR2 SUR3 SUR4 SUR5 3SLS1 3SLS2 3SLS3 3SLS4 3SLS5 
Panel A: 
Tertiary 
educati
on 
migratio
n 
          
 
FDI1990 
0.0442
6  
(0.0420
9) 
−0.019
18  
(0.0591
1) 
0.0550
7  
(0.0422
8) 
0.0444
7  
(0.0419
3) 
0.0422
8  
(0.0440
4) 
0.0733
4  
(0.070) 
0.0095
5  
(0.127) 
0.1054
3  
(0.067) 
0.0711
5  
(0.070) 
0.1117  
(0.072) 
 
FDI1990s
quared 
−0.198
75*** 
(0.0709
2) 
−0.101
64  
(0.0952
6) 
−0.218
46*** 
(0.0714
7) 
−0.200
32*** 
(0.0707
1) 
−0.192
47** 
(0.0741
4) 
−0.419
91*** 
(0.117) 
−0.328
52  
(0.199) 
−0.469
36*** 
(0.116) 
−0.417
59*** 
(0.117) 
−0.472
96*** 
(0.126) 
 Other 
countrie
s’ 
FDI1990 
−0.061
77* 
(0.0348
8) 
−0.064
31* 
(0.0351
3) 
−0.069
09** 
(0.0348
0) 
−0.060
67* 
(0.0347
7) 
−0.052
97  
(0.0356
5) 
−0.015
72  
(0.043) 
−0.004  
(0.043) 
−0.029
43  
(0.042) 
−0.013
16  
(0.043) 
−0.018
79  
(0.044) 
 Other 
countrie
s’ 
FDI1990s
quared 
0.0826
7  
(0.0643
0) 
0.0881
9  
(0.0649
9) 
0.0968
6  
(0.0651
1) 
0.0827  
(0.0640
7) 
0.0795
9  
(0.0640
4) 
0.0071
6  
(0.077) 
−0.013
02  
(0.077) 
0.0382
9  
(0.077) 
0.0051
4  
(0.077) 
0.0210
4  
(0.077) 
 
Tertiary 
migratio
n1990 
−0.225
75*** 
(0.0334
0) 
−0.235
27*** 
(0.0337
2) 
−0.223
03*** 
(0.0331
7) 
−0.224
87*** 
(0.0333
8) 
−0.228
57*** 
(0.0338
6) 
−0.087
94* 
(0.047) 
−0.092
07* 
(0.049) 
−0.084
56* 
(0.047) 
−0.087
58* 
(0.047) 
−0.084
77* 
(0.049) 
 R2 0.9453 0.9468 0.9468 0.9457 0.946 0.9373 0.9389 0.9388 0.9378 0.9367 
Panel B: 
Seconda
ry 
educati
on 
migratio
n 
          
 
FDI1990 
0.0144
9* 
(0.0081
0) 
0.0233
5** 
(0.0113
2) 
0.0145
7* 
(0.0080
4) 
0.0145
9* 
(0.0077
4) 
0.0161
7* 
(0.0084
4) 
0.0206
9* 
(0.012) 
0.0357
6* 
(0.022) 
0.0163
9  
(0.011) 
0.0200
2* 
(0.012) 
0.0249
1** 
(0.012) 
 
FDI1990s
quared 
−0.030
02*** 
(0.0113
6) 
−0.042
25*** 
(0.0157
9) 
−0.029
64*** 
(0.0113
0) 
−0.030
43*** 
(0.0108
5) 
−0.032
26*** 
(0.0116
7) 
−0.039
33** 
(0.017) 
−0.060
10** 
(0.030) 
−0.033
35** 
(0.016) 
−0.038
76** 
(0.016) 
−0.044
74*** 
(0.017) 
 Other 
countrie
s’ FDI1990 
−0.002
91  
(0.0068
3) 
−0.002
82  
(0.0068
6) 
−0.002
59  
(0.0067
5) 
−0.002
13  
(0.0065
4) 
−0.003
85  
(0.0069
0) 
−0.000
27  
(0.008) 
0.0006  
(0.007) 
0.0020
8  
(0.007) 
0.0013
3  
(0.007) 
−0.002
38  
(0.008) 
 Other 
countrie
s’ 
FDI1990s
quared 
0.0039
2  
(0.0123
9) 
0.0039
2  
(0.0124
8) 
0.0061
2  
(0.0123
7) 
0.0038
7  
(0.0118
5) 
0.0043
1  
(0.0123
3) 
0.0004
1  
(0.014) 
−0.001
08  
(0.013) 
0.0001
7  
(0.013) 
−0.000
81  
(0.013) 
0.0023
6  
(0.013) 
 
Seconda
ry 
migratio
n1990 
−0.091
23*** 
(0.0290
0) 
−0.083
33*** 
(0.0292
1) 
−0.086
88*** 
(0.0287
0) 
−0.088
19*** 
(0.0284
1) 
−0.083
12*** 
(0.0299
0) 
−0.072
06** 
(0.030) 
−0.058
42* 
(0.030) 
−0.061
62** 
(0.029) 
−0.068
17** 
(0.029) 
−0.063
45** 
(0.030) 
 R2 0.4071 0.4236 0.4317 0.4611 0.4161 0.4281 0.443 0.4677 0.4873 0.4358 
Panel C: 
Primary 
educati
on 
migratio
n 
          
 
FDI1990 
0.0014
8  
(0.0039
1) 
−0.001
11  
(0.0055
0) 
0.0038
8  
(0.0037
6) 
0.0014
4  
(0.0037
1) 
−0.000
69  
(0.0040
1) 
0.0040
3  
(0.006) 
0.0009
6  
(0.011) 
0.0029  
(0.005) 
0.0034
3  
(0.006) 
0.0072
1  
(0.006) 
 
FDI1990s
quared 
−0.004
66  
(0.0055
4) 
−0.001
04  
(0.0076
9) 
−0.007
75  
(0.0053
1) 
−0.005
19  
(0.0052
6) 
−0.002
17  
(0.0055
7) 
−0.008
19  
(0.008) 
−0.004
01  
(0.015) 
−0.006
89  
(0.008) 
−0.007
98  
(0.008) 
−0.012
35  
(0.008) 
 Other 
countrie
s’ 
FDI1990 
0.0043
8  
(0.0031
6) 
0.0041
5  
(0.0032
1) 
0.0026
2  
(0.0030
3) 
0.0048
5  
(0.0030
1) 
0.0041
2  
(0.0032
2) 
0.0044
4  
(0.004) 
0.0047
2  
(0.004) 
0.0042  
(0.003) 
0.0053
1  
(0.003) 
0.0024
5  
(0.004) 
 Other 
countrie
s’ 
FDI1990s
quared 
−0.005
37  
(0.0058
8) 
−0.004
86  
(0.0059
9) 
−0.000
57  
(0.0057
6) 
−0.005
66  
(0.0055
9) 
−0.005
96  
(0.0057
9) 
−0.005
31  
(0.007) 
−0.005
73  
(0.007) 
−0.002
99  
(0.006) 
−0.006
19  
(0.006) 
−0.002
88  
(0.006) 
 
Primary 
migratio
n1990 
−0.166
17*** 
(0.0173
2) 
−0.167
39*** 
(0.0173
2) 
−0.168
74*** 
(0.0164
8) 
−0.159
10*** 
(0.0168
8) 
−0.168
79*** 
(0.0168
9) 
−0.165
42*** 
(0.018) 
−0.165
27*** 
(0.018) 
−0.163
38*** 
(0.017) 
−0.158
39*** 
(0.018) 
−0.173
15*** 
(0.018) 
 R2 0.8031 0.8037 0.8258 0.8237 0.8118 0.8042 0.8059 0.8312 0.8262 0.8032 
 
Observa
tions 
82 81 82 82 82 80 79 80 80 80 
Notes: 
(i) Standard errors in brackets. 
(ii) ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. (iii) SURI includes control variables: common language, 
distance, political freedom, landlocked, income and unemployment; SUR2 includes the control variables in SURI 
and trade; SUR3 includes the control variables in SURI and inflation; SUR4 includes the control variables in SURI 
and common border; SUR5 includes the control variables in SURI and regional dummies (South Asia and West 
European countries). (iv) The set of instrumental variables for the three-stage least squares regressions (3SLS) is 
as follows: the log value of land area in host country, domestic credit provided by banking sector in host country 
as a share of GDP and double taxation treaty, which is a dummy variable indicating a double taxation treaty 
governing ‘income and capital’ in place between host and parent country. 
 
The results from Table 6 are consistent with results from Table 5 in terms of the coefficients on FDI1990 and 
FDI19902. However, in all three panels, FDI from other countries does not seem to exert a discernible effect on 
out-migration, regardless of migrants’ level of education. 
5. Conclusion 
Our study is among the first ones to separately look at the impact of FDI in LDCs on the out-migration of 
individuals with three different levels of education. With data on migration from 19 LDCs to 14 DCs, we find that 
inward FDI in LDC tends to, in general, reduce out-migration of individuals with secondary and tertiary 
education, but has no significant impact on the out-migration of individuals with only primary education. 
Furthermore, our work goes beyond the examination of the net effect of FDI on the migration of individuals with 
tertiary and secondary education. It does this by focusing on the strength of the home effect and the linkage 
effect of FDI. We find that inward FDI in LDCs has a stronger home effect on tertiary education migration, while 
it has a stronger linkage effect on secondary and primary education migration. 
FDI from other countries is a measure we use to capture the effect of FDI from countries other than the country 
of destination of interest. We find that in general FDI from other countries may not have a significant effect on 
migration of individuals compared to FDI from the destination country of interest. 
International migration is an important component of globalisation and has emerged as a crucial issue facing 
both developed and less developed countries. Our results have important implications to policymakers, 
especially policymakers in LDCs. A better understanding of flows of migrants with different skills is key to 
enhance the role of migration in the development process. For example, to address the concern of brain drain, 
government policies might be effective in limiting skilled labour outflows temporarily. But the creation of 
economic incentives through the operation of market forces, such as inward FDI, would be the more effective 
way to retain skilled workers in their home countries. In addition, policies that help the government to keep a 
close tie with diaspora and encourage the return of them would also be beneficial to migrants-sending 
countries. Indirectly, our results also provide some support for preferential policies towards MNCs to attract 
more FDI. 
Footnotes 
1 According to the US Department of Commerce, inward FDI is defined as the direct or indirect ownership of at 
least 10 per cent of the voting power of a business enterprise by a single foreign parent corporation. 
2 Interested readers are referred to Bellak (2004) for a detailed survey of studies on the performance gap 
between foreign affiliates and domestic firms. 
3 In our study, ‘home country’ refers to the home country for migrants or the migrants-sending country; 
‘destination country’ refers to the migrants-receiving country. 
4 See http://nis.princeton.edu/. 
5 Given an annual rate of economic growth of x per cent, a country’s average income will double in (70/x) years. 
To quadruple income from $975 to $3,856, it will take a country 2×(70/5) = 28 years with a 5 per 
cent economic growth rate, but only 2×(70/10) = 14 years for a country with 10 per cent economic 
growth rate. 
6 See, for example, Bornschier and Chase-Dunn (1985), Sauvant et al. (1993), Blomstrom et al. 
(1994), Borensztein et al. (1998), Choe (2003), Alfaro et al. (2004), Blonigen and Wang (2005), Carkovic 
and Levine (2005) and Wang and Wong (2009) for discussions of the impact of FDI on economic growth 
in host countries. 
7 We recognise that there can be two-way causality in a model involving inward FDI and out-migration. For 
example, the migration flow from country A to country B can also affect FDI from B to A. To address the 
potential endogeneity problem, we introduce equation (1), where our independent variables are 
obtained from 1990 and the dependent variable, migration, is the change in migrants stock from 1990 to 
2000. Intuitively, we argue that the change in migration after 1990 should not affect the initial level of 
FDI in 1990. As a result, this specification should prevent the reverse causality from FDI to migration. 
8 The classification of high-income OECD countries is obtained from the World Bank. 
9 Primary education is equivalent to zero to eight years of schooling, secondary education to 9–12 years of 
schooling and tertiary education to 13+ years of schooling. According to Docquier and Marfouk (2004), 
the original information from different national population surveys and registered data includes only 
skill levels of migrants such as low-skilled, medium-skilled, high-skilled and unknown. They convert the 
skill levels into corresponding education levels. In addition, since Docquier and Marfouk use census and 
register data, illegal immigration is not captured. The measure also excludes a large number of students 
who are in foreign countries to complete their education. 
10 Suppose that as of 1990, 1,000 people who have achieved secondary education are living in Canada 
(country i), but were born in Thailand (country j). Also suppose that in 1990, there are 100,000 people 
who were born and living in Thailand with secondary education. Then, the migration (rate) of individuals 
with secondary education from Thailand to Canada is  or 1 
per cent, where e = secondary education, and t = 1990. 
11 We obtain data for Taiwan from the Asian Development Bank. 
12 Common language consists of the official language as well as a language spoken by at least 9 per cent of the 
population. 
13 Javorcik et al. (2011), with a panel model, adopt the instrumental variable approach to control for the 
endogeneity between FDI and migration in the same period t. 
14 Due to the fact that we also have squared FDI in our models, powers of instruments are also included as 
instruments (Kelejian, 1971). 
15 We report only the coefficients on FDI and initial migration. Other coefficient results are available upon 
request. 
16 http://topics.developmentgateway.org/special/foreigninvestment/template31.do#5. 
17 Equation (3) is equivalent 
to . 
18 We consider the following example: if there is already a well-established population from Thailand (j) in the 
US (i), then new migrants from Thailand might find themselves relatively easily connected with the local 
community in terms of language, culture and job opportunities. As a result, migrants from Thailand are 
more likely to stay in the US, obtain a good job and further migration from Thailand to the US will be 
encouraged. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX A 
Table A1. Destination and Home Countries 
Destination countries     
 Australia France Japan New Zealand Switzerland 
 Austria Germany Korea Norway United Kingdom 
 Canada Italy Netherlands Sweden United States 
Home countries     
 Argentina China Hong Kong Morocco Senegal 
 Bahamas Colombia Hungary Nigeria Singapore 
 Barbados Côte d’lvoire India Panama South Africa 
 Brazil Czech Republic Indonesia Philippines Taiwan 
 Bulgaria Egypt Israel Poland Thailand 
 Cameroon El Salvador Malaysia Romania Turkey 
 Chile Gabon Mexico Saudi Arabia Venezuela 
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